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SURFACE MINING ACTIVITIES
integration is the only feasible means to obtain equal educational
opportunity. This doctrine collides head-on with the social impossi-
bility at present of achieving this goal. Whether other courts
will be flexible enough to explore alternative solutions, instead of
following the precedent of Hobsen v. Hansen, with its inherent
rigidity, might have an important bearing on the ultimate means
employed to solve the educational crisis in the urban schools.
There has been no attempt to formulate answers to the issues
raised in the case, except to suggest that the courts not narrow
their inquiry to the integration question alone. While few educa-
tors would deny that integration should be an important goal of any
educational system, if techniques and programs are developed
which prove to be effective within the different locales, the court
should reconsider before condemning them as discriminatory, mere-
ly because integration is not an end result.
NEILL G. McBRYDE
Constitutional Law-Governmental Regulation of Surface
Mining Activities
Surface mining in the United States has affected 3.2 million
acres of land. Of this total, 2.0 million acres need varying de-
grees of treatment to alleviate a range of environmental damage
both on-site and off-site. About 20,000 active operations are dis-
turbing the land at a rate estimated in excess of 150,000 acres
annually. Data submitted by the surface mining industries in-
dicate that, in 1964, the amount of land partially or completely
reclaimed was equivalent to only 31 percent of the area dis-
turbed in that year. Surface mining activities are expected to
expand rapidly in coming years. By 1980, it is expected that
more than 5 million acres will have been affected by surface
mining.
Some damage from surface mining is inevitable even with the
best mining and land restoration methods. But much can be done
to prevent damage and to reclaim mined lands.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an operation having the magnitude of surface mining in the
United States, the relationship existing between this activity and
the general public and the degree of control to be exercised in the
'STRIP AND SURFACE MINE STUDY POLICY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 104 (1967).
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public's interest are of paramount importance. The rapidly in-
creasing population, the expansion of suburban areas, and the
recognized need for area-wide control of land uses are on a col-
lision course with the desirability of exploiting our natural re-
sources, particularly the numerous mineral resources found in
North Carolina. This problem is exemplified by current surface
mining practices and the probability that they will be increasingly
utilized within the state.
Surface mining may be subdivided into the general categories
of strip mining and quarrying.2 While these two methods differ
technically, the legal problems involved in their regulation are
similar. Strip mining is accomplished from the surface of the
earth and is generally performed by stripping off the earth, known
as overburden, which lies over the mineral, and then by removing
the mineral uncovered beneath the overburden. Open-pit is synony-
mous with quarry, and quarrying involves a large opening in the
earth from which rock, sand or ores are taken. The term "quarry"
is not properly applicable to the comparatively slight excavation
made primarily for construction. Both strip mining and quarrying
entail the removal of a large volume of surface "waste" material
with a resulting piling of this material at a nearby location and an
excavated opening or openings which accumulate water if not re-
filled with the waste or other substance. Both operations are char-
acterized by noise, dust, and extensive use of mechanical equip-
ment.
That a person's property shall not be taken except by due process
of law and that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws are
guarantees afforded by the United States Constitution 8 and the
North Carolina Constitution.' Into this area of historical rights
2 Governmental controls over commercial mining practices extend to
surface evacuation of ore and minerals and of sand and gravel, by the
"open pit" and "strip mining" methods; to subsurface extraction of ore and
materials; to air and stream pollution; to the processing plants where crush-
ing, washing and mineral-gangue separation is accomplished; and to dis-
position of the gangue (non-commercial minerals and rock separated from
the desired mineral). The scope of this comment will be limited to controls
exerted over surface evacuations. Unless otherwise noted, no distinction
will be stressed between excavations of ore and of sand and gravel. While
regulations of strip mining methods are emphasized, some material deals
with open pit methods, and it is believed that the problems encountered and
the extent of permissible regulations of the two methods, relative to the
excavation process, are essentially the same.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
'N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
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stalks the police power as an inherent right of governmental units
to provide for the public health, welfare, safety and morals of their
citizenry. 5 This power, while incapable of an exact definition or
limitation,6 is relied on "to prohibit or regulate certain acts or func-
tions of the populace as may be deemed to be inimical to the com-
fort, safety, health and welfare of society." 7 Utilization of this
power is the basis by which state and local government units will
be in a position to cope with developing problems, relatively new to
North Carolina but previously encountered in other states, attend-
dant to surface mining activities.
There is no legal right to exploit natural resources wherever
they may be found." This principle, in conjunction with the police
power, furnishes the foundation for a governmental unit's endeav-
ors to regulate mining activities. Development of controls over
surface excavation practices has followed a familiar pattern of
judicial and legislative reaction to the changing social and economi-
cal conditions created by an increasing population and urbanization.
This envolvement has progressed from earlier prohibitory legisla-
tion, closely scrutinized by the courts as an invasion of property
rights, to the more recent utilization of zoning plans and direct
regulations that are recognized as requisites for protecting the pub-
lic interest. Both procedures are generally viewed as proper appli-
cations of the police power, subject to an ever present requirement
of reasonableness. While the courts stand ready to oversee the
reasonableness of legislation and to protect constitutionally granted
rights, control of such mining activities is basically one for legis-
lative concern.'
Regulation of surface activities may be classified into direct
regulations enacted by the state legislative bodies and having state-
wide effect, and local regulations enacted by the states' political
subdivisions pursuant to the authority delegated by the states. The
local regulations may be by direct control of particular conduct
'See, e.g., Lees v. Bay Area Air Pollution Control Dist., 238 Cal. App.
2d 850, 856, 48 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
'Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
"Davis v. Barrett, 253 Iowa 1178, 1180, 115 N.W. 2d 839, 841 (1962)(emphasis added).
"E.g., Township of Bloomfield v. Beardslee, 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d
537 (1957).
' Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Ky. 1960),
where the court stated: "Short of that which is proved to be arbitrary, wan-
ton, or malicious, the control of commercial mining practices is strictly a
matter of legislative regulation."
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where the activity is prohibited or the manner of conducting the
activity is regulated, or through zoning legislation involving com-
prehensive regulation of land uses by districts and regulation of
certain permitted conduct within the district. Both the direct and
zoning controls may have the practical effect of prohibiting a de-
sired usage.
II. EARLY VIEWS
Early attempts to regulate surface activity were local legisla-
tions of a direct nature. The earliest were in the form of outright
prohibitions directed at undesirable activities such as pig sties and
livery stables. If found to be a nuisance per se, the activity could
be regulated; but, if not, it was an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This approach was
relaxed in Reinman v. City of Little Rock' where the United States
Supreme Court upheld the state's finding that a livery stable was a
nuisance in fact and in law, provided the state did not act arbitrar-
ily or unjustly discriminatorily, and that a municipal ordinance for-
bidding the conduct of a livery stable within a designated area could
not be enjoined. Early legislation prohibiting surface mining was
viewed in respect to the public safety but was generally held to be
an unconstitutional taking of property" and to be a restriction that
could not be imposed upon a legitimate business without compen-
sation.'2 This approach was predicated on use of the police power
being justified only if the operation of a quarry or mine would
result in injury to the person or property of another. 13 Illustrative
of this is Ex parte Kelso4 where a municipal ordinance prohibited
the operation of rock quarries within designated limits of San
10237 U.S. 171 (1915).
" See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
The California Supreme Court discussed the earlier California cases and
distinguished them in view of the more recent developments in compre-
hensive zoning.
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Pacific States
Supply Co. v. City of San Francisco, 171 F. 727 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1909);
Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 100 A.
820 (1917); Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W. 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
1 8Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966).
14 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905). While the court invalidated the ordi-
nance as prohibiting quarrying, they did recognize the state's power to regu-
late the manner in which the quarrying operation was conducted, on the
basis that uncontrolled quarrying may be performed in such a manner to
occasion injury.
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Francisco, irrespective of whether a quarry might cause injury to
others. Holding the ordinance to be an improper use of the police
power, the court emphasized that the use to which a person could
put his property could not be interfered with or limited except to
the extent that such use would definitely result in legal injury.
While outright prohibitions were generally unfavorably ac-
cepted, a regulation of the manner of conducting an activity was
likely to be sustained if the court found the regulation to be reason-
able, even if the practical effect of the regulation amounted to a
prohibition. This judicial approach is exemplified by the landmark
case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian.1 5 A Los Angeles ordinance made
it unlawful to establish or operate a brickyard or brickkiln within
designated areas. The petitioner owned a tract of land located
within the designated area and containing a valuable deposit of
clay used in the manufacture of bricks. He contended that, if
required to manufacture his bricks at a location other than on the
tract containing the clay deposit, the operation could not be eco-
nomically conducted. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as
a valid regulation of the manner in which the overall brickmaking
process could be conducted. Recognizing that such a control could
result in prohibiting the petitioner from mining his clay and that
it would be an extension of the Reinman case, since the mining
operation could not be conducted elsewhere, the Court insisted that
the ordinance was only a regulation within the designated locality
over the manufacture of the clay into bricks. It distinguished the
Kelso case by viewing the ordinance as a control over the offensive
effects of a commercial operation rather than as a deprivation of
the mineral deposit.
III. TRANSITION STAGE
That a governmental unit could prohibit the uses of property
without compensation, and without justifying it as being a common
law nuisance or creating a risk of imminent injuries, was recog-
nized for the first time by the United States Supreme Court in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1" A municipality's com-
prehensive zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location
of commercial and residential structures, the lot area to be built
upon, and the size and height of buildings was held to be a valid
15239 U.S. 394 (1915).
18272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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exercise of the police power. In justifying the advent of such
restrictions, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland,
pointed to the increase and concentration of population as creating
new problems requiring regulations that earlier would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. This was accomplished, not
by varying the meaning of constitutional guaranties, but by ad-
justing the scope of their application to meet the changing con-
ditions within the field of their operation. The Court further
emphasized that such ordinances, and all similar laws and regula-
tions, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
as it is asserted for the general public welfare, and that the line
separating the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power
is not capable of precise delimitation but varies with circumstances
and conditions. The role of the judiciary in the zoning process
was reiterated by the Court's statement: "If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable,
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."' 7  Of particu-
lar interest is the Court's acceptance that, in comprehensive regu-
lations, some "innocent" activities may suffer the same fate as
offensive activities, but the inclusion of a reasonable margin reach-
ing innocent activities will not invalidate the controls.
The Euclid case stands as a milestone in the acceptance of a
new. innovation which places permissible limitations on individual
rights. This raises a question as to why the courts differentiate
between direct prohibitions and zoning controls that may, and
often do, have the effect of a prohibition. While a direct prohibi-
tion is an outright regulation of a single or related group of
activities, a prohibition fostered by zoning is an essential part of
an overall comprehensive plan of uses within a designated district.
The preferential treatment afforded zoning regulations by the courts
seems to have its basis in the fact that a particular prohibition is
only one cog in the comprehensive scheme, rather than a "one-shot"
effort directed at an undesirable activity and uncoordinated with
other controls that have been enacted or may be enacted in the fu-
ture by the governmental subdivisions.:'
1' 272 U.S. at 388, citing from Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294
(1924). Accord, Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.
381 (1925).
See City of Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931)
where the court upheld a zoning regulation prohibiting the construction of
a filling station after previously invalidating an ordinance directly prohibit-
ing such construction.
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Judicial acceptance of zoning legislation, rather than direct
prohibitory legislation, as a constitutional regulation of property
uses even though the particular use could not be conducted at anoth-
er location, is illustrated in Blancett v. Montgomery. 9 A municipal
ordinance prohibited the drilling of oil wells within the corporate
limits, and a general zoning ordinance classified the proposed drilling
sites as residential. The trial court held the prohibitory ordinance
to be invalid as unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory but did
not make a finding as to the validity of the zoning ordinance. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's results; and
assuming, but without deciding, that the prohibitory ordinance was
invalid, the court held the general zoning ordinance to be a valid
exercise of the police power and not to be a taking of property
without due process nor an abridgment of equal protection rights.'
IV. REGULATION THROUGH ZONING
As a general proposition, the principles applied in the zoning
of other industries and buildings are also applicable to the regu-
lation of surface mining.-' The legislation must have a real or
substantial relation to the police power goals,22 and its effect on
the landowner should be considered3 Since the Euclid case, a
gradual accumulation of case law on zoning controls over surface
mining activities has provided insights into the requisites for ju-
dicial acceptance of these regulations. While the courts' principal
concerns are that the legislation be reasonable and not discrimina-
tory and that the legislative bodies have discretion to act within
these limits, the cases also reveal an influence derived from various
aspects of zoning's relation to aesthetic considerations, non-con-
forming uses, and special use permits.
19398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966).
The court stated: "As a general proposition a valid exercise of the
police power resulting in expense or loss of property is not a taking of
property without due process of law or without just compensation, nor does
it abridge the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States." 398 S.W.2d at 881, citing 6 E. McQulL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 24.05-.06, (3d ed. 1949). E.g.,
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
21 Cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958);
Town of Seekonk v. John J. McHale & Sons, Inc., 325 Mass. 271, 90 N.E.2d
325 (1950).
58 A[. Jun. Zoning § 97 (1948). See, e.g., Kane v. Kreiter, 25 Ohio
Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
."See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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A. Prohibition of a Use
A well documented opinion of the power to prohibit a use is
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles.24 An
ordinance established a comprehensive zoning plan for Los Angeles,
restricting the plaintiff's property to agricultural and residential
uses, but with provisions for a supplemental use district. A request
for the supplemental use was denied. The trial court, after finding
that dust from the proposed rock, sand and gravel quarrying would
carry to nearby residences and sanitariums, denied injunctive relief
to the plaintiff. Since the property was suitable only for gravel pit
operations, the ordinance not only prohibited a desired use but also
prevented any economical use of the property. Applying a test of
limiting the legislative action only if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
discriminatory, the California Supreme Court found that reasonable
minds could differ,25 in which case the court would not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body, and that the ordinance
was a valid exercise of the police power. Earlier California cases
had indicated legislative authorities could not constitutionally pro-
hibit the extraction of natural resources when they were the primary
or preponderant value of the property. In rejecting this view, the
court pointed to an extended line of cases upholding zoning ordi-
nances that prohibited the removal of natural resources and refusing
to distinguish between the prohibition of their removal and the
prohibition of other uses. 6 As a basis for this approach, the court
traced the history of prohibitory legislation from the period before
comprehensive zoning, through its acceptance in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 7 and into its more recent applications."8
Attacks on zoning controls are often predicated on financial loss
to the owner. This is particularly applicable to removal of natural
products as a result of their immobility and the impossibility of
conducting the industry at another locality. Although a compari-
son of values before and after the regulation is relevant, it is not
2' 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 36 (1962). See 50 Calif. L. Rev. 896 (1962).
2" Disagreement between the city planning commission and the city
council relative to granting the plaintiff's application for a supplemental use
is indicative of how reasonable minds may differ.
28 See cases cited 57 Cal. 2d at 529, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
27272 U.S. 365 (1926).
"
8 E.g., West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192
S.E. 881, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937).
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conclusive in determining the validity of controls.2 9 A typical ap-
proach is that an exercise of the police power, either through zoning
or direct prohibition that precludes what may be a more profitable
use of the property, does not violate a person's constitutional rights
if the exercise of the power is otherwise valid."0
In Consolidated the court did not apply a test relating to the
effect on the landowner, but relied on the "fairly debatable" effect
quarrying had on contiguous property and the overriding principle
of protecting the general public. Support for the position that the
prohibition was not an unconstitutional taking without compensa-
tion was found in Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles3 l
where the federal court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance
prohibiting extraction of oil from lands in a residential zone. Addi-
tional support for this position is City of Trussville v. Porter3 '
involving a municipal ordinance zoning an area for "General In-
dustry." The Porter opinion extended judicial acceptance of
"legislative" action by upholding the delegation of authority to a
building inspector to permit or deny quarrying based on his opinion
of whether it would create objectionable conditions affecting a
considerable portion of the city. The court upheld the inspector's
denial of a permit and refused to enjoin what it found to be a valid
ordinance even though it deprived people of a right to earn an
income. This approach is traceable to the United States Supreme
Court's statement relating to the police power in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian :
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the
most essential powers of the government,-one that is the least
"See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
" E.g., Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582
(1961); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 60 I1. App. 2d 39, 208
N.E.2d 430 (1965). But see East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 166 Ohio St.
379, 143 N.E.2d 309 (1957). While not discussing the removal of natural
products, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in City of Elizabeth City
v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) that financial loss is not the
test of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance.
"47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931); accord,
Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966).
" 279 Ala. 467, 187 So. 2d 224 (1966); accord, Southern Rock Prod.
Co. v. Self, 279 Ala. 488, 492, 187 So. 2d 244, 246 (1966) where the court
stated: "Unquestionably a municipality has authority to pass zoning ordi-
nances which regulate the use of private property and the authority to pro-
mulgate ordinances prohibiting the removal or crushing of rock from lands
lying in certain areas or under certain conditions."239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (citations omitted).
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limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually
is on some individual but the imperative necessity for its exis-
tence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbi-
trarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because
of conditions once obtaining . . . To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests
are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community.
Consideration of the prohibition's effect on the property owner
and the necessity for more than a passing acceptance of the legis-
lative determination that such a prohibition is needed find support
in Kane v. Kreiter3 where a township ordinance zoned an area as
agricultural, thereby preventing the strip mining of coal. Recogniz-
ing that the classification of uses must be reasonable, the court
further required that pre-existing vested rights be considered and
protected. It noted that the plaintiff's land was steep, hilly, run-
down and unsuited for farming and held the deprivation to be a
taking without due process in violation of the United States and
Ohio Constitutions. A frequent view is that incidental damage
resulting from zoning, such as a dimunition of land values, does
not violate due process unless the restriction practically or sub-
stantially renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes."
Efforts to establish a control as an exercise of eminent domain,
rather than of police power, as a basis for invalidating a zoning
regulation have been unsuccessful once the ordinance was found to
bear a reasonable relationship to the general public welfare. As ob-
served in Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles,"0 the very essence
of the police power, as differentiated from the power of eminent
domain, is that the deprivation of individual rights and property
cannot prevent its operation if its exercise is proper and the method
of exercise is reasonably within the meaning of due process.
Whether the mining operation will constitute a common law
" 25 Ohio Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
See Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d
275 (1953); East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 166 Ohio St. 379, 143 N.E. 2d
309 (1957). The East Fairfield court stated: "[W]e must consider the pro-
tective effect of the constitutional guaranties upon the owner of the land in
question; whether the power exists to forbid the use must not be considered
abstractly, but in connection with all the circumstances and locality of the
land itself and its surroundings." 166 Ohio St. at 382, 143 N.E.2d at 311.
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Bubler
v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).
ae 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d 865 (1953).
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nuisance is not controlling in determining the validity of a zoning
ordinance, but the law of nuisances may be consulted for the helpful
assistance of its analogies in ascertaining the reasonableness of the
controls."7 A modification of this approach is advanced in Kane v.
Kreiter s where, in addition to considering the reasonableness of the
prohibition, the court stated that the desired control would be valid
only if it prohibited what would become an actual nuisance.
Aesthetic considerations are generally held to be insufficient,
when unsupported by other factors, to sustain the zoning power
although there is authority indicating the law in this area is not
settled and that a solely aesthetic approach may have a definite re-
lation to the public welfare. 9 Aesthetics are usually an auxiliary
consideration, with the validity of controls on mineral extraction
supported by other considerations.40 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has taken the position that aesthetic factors alone are insuffi-
cient to support use of the police power.4"
While needing support from other factors, aesthetics have
played an influential role in decisions upholding zoning controls
of mining activities. The court in Town of Burlington v. Dunn
seemed to be swayed by aesthetic considerations of possible conse-
quences in upholding a zoning ordinance preventing the removal of
top soil from land within the town. They discussed the disagree-
able dust and noise that would result from machinery removing
the soil but considered, as more important, that a "desert" area
would remain after removal of the top soil and that such an un-
sightly waste in a residential area would permanently depress the
value of surrounding property. An interesting approach was taken
by the court in Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Knox County,43 in-
validating a zoning prohibition on strip mining of coal, where they
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); cf.
Township of Bloomfield v. Beardslee, 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).8 25 Ohio Op. 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1963).
" 58 Am!. JUR. Zoning § 30 (1948). In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d
263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), the court overruled prior
New York cases and held that aesthetic objectives alone will support a
zoning ordinance although the exercise of the police power should not ex-
tend to every artistic conformity or nonconformity.
"°See Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.
Cal. 1946).
'" State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959). This case did
not involve regulation of surface mining activities.
"2318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945);
accord, Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947).
" 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953).
19671
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
distinguished the Dunn case by a casual remark that coal is not as
plentiful as top soil.
Nonconforming uses may generally be continued irrespective
of subsequently enacted prohibitions. In controls over mining and
quarrying this is sometimes extended to permit continuance of the
nonconforming use over the entire property in question and not
restricted solely to the portion which was mined or quarried prior
to adoption of the prohibition.44 Contrary to this position are the
decisions which have found that the continued operations "vary"
from the prior uses and therefore are not within the nonconforming
uses doctrine. In De Felice v. Zoning Board of Appeals45 a change
in the mechanical process for washing and screening sand prior to
its removal from the sand pit was sufficient to prevent the altered
process from being an existing use within the zoning classification.
The Dunn court also refused to consider the removal of top soil
as an existing use when the prior use was a gravel pit from which
the top soil had been removed.
B. Regulation of a Use
Use of the zoning power to regulate, rather than to prohibit,
surface mining activity has taken the format of applying a zoning
classification to an area but permitting the extraction as a special use
if a special permit is obtained. "Special use" is defined as a method
of land use control where the zoning ordinance retains the usual
residential, commercial and industrial zones, and in addition
establishes special uses that are permitted if approved by a zoning
board or governing legislative body." The purpose of a special
use is to provide the board with a procedure for the alleviation of
land usage restrictions which result in limitations bearing no rea-
sonable relation to the objectives of the police power.47 The govern-
ment's ability to regulate specific onsite activities and to require
other conditions to be fulfilled is treated in a subsequent discussion
of state acts.
The general rule of reasonableness applies to the regulation and
to the action of the agency issuing the special use permits. In La
"Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966).
" 130 Conn. 156, 32 A.2d 635 (1943) ; see Wilbur v. Newton, 302 Mass.
38, 18 N.E.2d 365 (1938).Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
City of Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand & Gravel Co., 209 A.2d 227 (R.I.
1965).
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Salle National Bank v. County of Cook48 an ordinance zoning an
area for heavy industry also provided for quarrying as a special
use upon issuance of a permit by the county commissioners. The
commissioners refused to issue a special permit for the quarrying
of limestone. The court considered evidence of lower property
values, pollution of wells, harmful effects due to the general noise,
and the dirt and attractive nuisance qualities and held the com-
missioner's refusal to be reasonable and not arbitrary or capri-
cious." Decrease in value of the zoned deposits was also considered
to be an insufficient basis for invalidating the ordinance. However,
refusal to issue a special permit was held to be an unenforceable
regulation of quarrying in City of Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand &
Gravel Co.5" where sand and gravel were being removed prior to
the enactment of a zoning ordinance requiring a permit for con-
tinuation of the operation.
Powers delegable to a board in the issuance of a special permit
were etended in Houdaille Construction Materials, Inc. v. Board of
Adjustment5" where the court upheld the board's imposition of cer-
tain performance standards that were in addition to the standards
required by the zoning ordinance. Although the company could
meet the standards of the ordinance, the court further required it
to meet the board's additional standards that were considered to be
reasonable.
Dangers of infringement of equal protection rights are preva-
lent in the issuance or denial of special permits. Provisions for
permitting a special use are likely to authorize inadvertent or arbi-
trary treatment of a specific operation that is not afforded other
similar ones; and they are likely to authorize any given operation
having essentially identical effects as non-permitted operations.
Considering these discriminatory aspects, the court in Town of
Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co.52 held that requiring a permit
" 60 Ill. App. 2d 39, 208 N.E.2d 430 (1965). The court also gave six
guidelines for determining whether a zoning ordinance is valid or is in-
valid as a taking without compensation.
" Accord, Raimondo v. Board of Appeals, 331 Mass. 228, 118 N.E.2d 67
(1954).
( 0209 A.2d 227 (R.I. 1965).
" 92 N.J. Super. 293, 223 A.2d 210 (App. Div. 1966).
"2 266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 697 (1954). Accord, Northern Ill. Coal
Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947) where the ordinance was
held to discriminate against strip miners unless it regulated everyone and
every industry that endangered the public health or conservation in a man-
ner similar to strip mining.
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to operate a stone quarry in areas zoned as agricultural, but not re-
quiring one for similar quarries in industrial zones or for other
mining operations in agricultural zones, was an unreasonable classi-
fication and not germane to the police power objectives. The court
emphasized that any ordinance which limits or restricts the right
of a person to engage in a legitimate business must apply equally
to all persons engaged in a like business where the circumstances
and conditions are similar.
Zoning ordinances providing for a variance from the zoned
classification are subject to rules similar to those pertaining to
special uses. Discretionary refusal of a board to grant a permissive
variance for sand and gravel removal in an agricultural-residential
district was held in Calcagno v. Town Board 3 not to be a taking
of property without compensation when the court found the evi-
dence insufficient to establish that the property met the criteria for
a variance within the ordinance.
V. DIRECT PROHIBITIONS AND REGULATIONS (NON-ZONING)
Direct prohibitions and regulations, as distinguished from zon-
ing legislation, have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power where the restrictions exemplify a substantial and definite
purpose to serve the public and the means adopted bear a reasonable
relationship to the accomplishment of this purpose. Such controls
are generally predicated on protection of the public safety. General
prohibitions having no apparent basis for their action, particularly
when left to the unrestrained control of a governing authority, are
usually held to be invalid.54
The requisite relationship to the public health and safety is dem-
onstrated in Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt55 where a municipal
ordinance prohibited strip mining of coal within the city. The
ordinance declared the stripping method to be dangerous and hazard-
ous to the person and property of the citizens and was predicated
on the operation's proximity to houses where small children played
and on the tendency of prior excavations to fill with water. Hold-
ing the operation to be an obvious danger to the public safety,
the court refused to invalidate the ordinance as a taking of property
without compensation or as violating due process. It found the
" 265 App. Div. 687, 41 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1943).
"'Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966). See particularly § 13 and §§ 15-18.21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582 (1961).
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ordiiance: to be reasonable and the preclusion of the most -profitable
use of, the property not to violate the owner's constitutional rights.",
The emphasis -placed on protection of the public safety is appar-
ent upon considering that the Prewitt court, which took a liberal
view when the public safety was obviously endangered, was the
same court that earlier, in Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Knox
County,57 had adopted a strict approach and invalidated a zoning
ordinance prohibiting strip mining upon a failure to find a substan-
tial relationship between the prohibition and the preservation of the
public health and safety. The Midland operation was considered
to have no detrimental effect on neighboring persons or properties,
and the land was suitable for reclamation as agricultural.
Principal opposition to a mining prohibition is found in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon" which held an attempt to prohibit coal
mining within a city to be an unconstitutional taking without com-
pensation. The value of Pennsylvania Coal as precedent for this
position is weakened by the United States Supreme Court's subse-
quent recognition of comprehensive zoning and its necessarily pro-
hibitory effect on commercial activities.5
Validity of direct legislation as a proper use of the police power
received substantial support in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.60
A city had grown around a sand and gravel quarrying operation and
a 20-acre lake created by the excavations. A prior ordinance re-
quiring a wire fence around the land and specific berm and slope
requirements was complied with by the operator, but an attempt to
prohibit the quarrying through zoning legislation failed when the
operation was found to be a prior nonconforming use. An ordi-
nance directed at regulation of the quarrying provided that no ex-
cavation could be made below two feet above the maximum ground
water level, prior excavations below the water level must be re-
filled, and a permit must be obtained. The United States Supreme
"See Schreiber v. Town of Cheektowaga, 195 Misc. 748, 91 N.Y.S.2d
403 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953).
260 U.S. 393 (1922). Accord, Ex parte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P.
241 (1905) ; see note 12 supra and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945),
for a discussion of the effect of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) on the earlier view taken by the Supreme Court in the
Pennsylvania Coal case.
00369 U.S. 590 (1962). Accord, Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan
& Zoning Comm'n, 25 Conn. Supp. 125, 197 A.2d 653 (Super. Ct. 1963).
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Court upheld the city's attempt to enjoin the operation in violation
of the ordinance despite the fact that it deprived the property of its
most beneficial use and, in essence, amounted to a prohibition of
the beneficial use to which the property had previously been devoted.
Conceding that no set formula exists for determining where regu-
lation ends and "taking" begins, the Court considered a compari-
son of values before and after the regulation to be relevant but
by no means conclusive, and relied on their previously established
rule that depriving property of its most beneficial use does not
render an ordinance unconstitutional. 61 Instrumental in the Court's
decision was the legislative intent that the ordinance serve as a
safety measure, and it was held to be a reasonable exercise of the
city's police power.
Regulatory- legislation may be considered a taking without com-
pensation if it interferes with operations which do not injure others
in their person or property 2 or if the granting of permission to
engage in the lawful activity regulated by the legislation is left to
the unrestricted discretion of an administrative agency, 3 thereby
not insuring a reasonable relationship to the public safety and
welfare.
VI. STATE REGULATIONS
Fortified by judicial acceptance of prohibitory and regulatory
controls, by both zoning and direct legislation, as valid exercises
of the police power, the more recent trend indicates an increasing
role by the states through direct regulation of surface mining. This
state role is in addition to the continuing local regulatory schemes.
Early state controls were essentially limited to mine safety re-
quirements, but these are being replaced or supplemented by state-
wide regulations and an Interstate Compact which concentrate on
rehabilitation of the disturbed land and protection of neighboring
properties. A principal development is the interest of the federal
government in this area. Identical bills are pending in the House
of Representatives and the Senate. 4 These bills would authorize
the establishment of an office within the Department of the Interior
"1 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
" Ex parte Davison, 321 Mo. 370, 13 S.W.2d 40 (1928).
'"Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Cal.
1946) ; Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 577, 269 P.2d 81 (1954).
8 S. 217, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 4719, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
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for administration of their provisions and are directed to the "rec-
lamation, acquisition, and conservation of lands and water adversely
affected by coal mining operations. '65 They would require an ope-
rator to obtain a permit, post a bond, preplan reclamation procedures,
and report his progress. Provisions are also included for render-
ing financial and technical assistance to state and local agencies.
Coverage of the bills extends to previously mined coal lands as
well as to land to be affected by future strip mining of coal.
Regulations at the state and federal levels will assume legal and
practical difficulties of a more significant magnitude than have been
encountered at the local levels. The most outstanding of these
problems is affording equal protection to all affected operators. In-
herent in a more widespread control are the difficulties of treating
all similar operations in an identical manner or of justifying any
preferential treatment directed at a particular class as a reasonable
classification. State regulations also face the problem of not being
correlated within an overall comprehensive scheme of usage regu-
lations, and therefore encounter the judicial objections experienced
by local direct prohibitions. The administration of a statewide
enactment raises practical questions as to the requisite administra-
tive structure and the ever present dilemma of what authority may
and should be delegated to various subordinate echelons. Offsetting
these adverse aspects is the potential in a state structure for better
trained and more competent professional personnel and for re-
search and development facilities.
At least nine states6" have adopted statewide enactments de-
signed to eliminate, or contain within acceptable bounds, the un-
desirable effects attendant with surface excavations and to reclaim
the affected land. Characteristics common to all or to a majority
of these legislative schemes include: (1) an application for a per-
mit must be filed; (2) the operator is required to post a performance
bond to insure compliance with the law; (3) the operator must sub-
'05 d.
"ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 180.1-.13 (Supp. 1966); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-
1501 to -1528 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 350.010-.990 (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 657-674 (Supp. 1967); OHIO CODE ANN.
§§1513.01-.19 (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. chap. 4, §§ 681.1-.22 and chap.
6, §§ 1396.1-.21 (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. chap. 15 (Supp. 1967); VA.
CODE ANN. chap. 15, §§ 45.1-162 to -179 (1967); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-2A-1
to -14 (1966). The federal government and forty-six states regulate sur-
face mining on government owned or controlled lands, but this discussion
will be limited to governmental controls exerted on privately owned lands.
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mit with his application a description of lands to be mined, and
periodic reports on the progress of the operation; (4) the disturbed
area must be reclaimed within specified time limits; (5) the dis-
turbed land must be graded to varying degrees; (6) performance
bonds are held until the state concludes that the reclamation has met
the requirements of the law; (7) failure to complete reclamation
results in forfeiture of the bond and, in some cases, prohibits the
issuance of new permits to the operator involved; and (8) criminal
penalties are prescribed for operating without a permit or license.
Three of the state laws regulate the surface mining of all miner-
als,67 one state law applies to all minerals except limestone, marble
and dimension stone,68 one state law applies to clay and coal,00 and
the remaining four apply only to coal."
Judicial testing of these state enactments is found in three lead-
ing cases decided during the period 1947-49. Of particular interest
in all three is the courts' concern with equal protection of the rights
of the operators and property owners. The Illinois act"' regulating
strip mining of coal was challenged by seventeen coal companies in
a successful attempt to enjoin its enforcement." The state pleaded
its police power as the basis for the act; but the court, in examining
the provisions, held that preservation of the public health was not
the object and purpose of the regulation. This was predicated on
the act's requirement that the land be restored to its original con-
figuration, which would include the restoration of a mosquito breed-
ing pond if one had originally existed, and that the final open cut
could be left unfilled if there was insufficient material available for
refilling, thereby leaving one open excavation for the accumulation
of water. The court indicated it would find a reasonable relation
to protecting the public health if the act required the elimination of
all ponds and other sources for the accumulation of water. A con-
servation argument as justification for the requirement that the land
be restored to a condition suitable for row crops, rather than re-
claimed by reforesting or reseeding of the unleveled ridges as
" Illinois; Indiana; West Virginia.
68 Tennessee.
Kentucky.70Maryland; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Virginia.
The Illinois act, as well as those of Pennsylvania and Maryland, con-
tained provisions essentially identical to the common characteristics dis-
cussed in the preceding textual paragraph. Selected provisions of these acts
are reiterated only as they are pertinent to the courts' considerations.
"Z Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947).
[Vol. 46
SURFACE MINING ACTIVITIES
previously conducted by the individual operators, was rejected as
a confiscation on the basis that the state cannot compel a private
owner, at his own expense, to convert his land to what the state
considers a better usage. The court further stipulated that, even
assuming the act to be a valid protection of the public health, it
was fatally defective as discriminatory against coal strip mining.
A regulation preventing the creation of water-filled excavations
and requiring contouring suitable for cultivation was held to be
an unconstitutional discrimination against coal operators unless it
applied equally to all operations leaving such excavations or land
unsuitable for cultivation. The court reiterated that it is the method
of mining employed, not the nature of the product removed, that
produces the undesirable result, and the object of the legislation
must be to prevent the use of that method. The Illinois law was
subsequently amended to eliminate these objectionable features
and to encompass the surface mining of all minerals within the State.
The Pennsylvania act regulated bituminous coal strip mining
operations. In an action to enjoin enforcement of the act,73 the
court upheld the legislature's authority to create a classification
for regulation and would not subject this classification (bitumi-
nous coal miners) to judicial revision unless it was grounded on
artificial or irrelevant distinctions rather than real distinctions.
Sufficient evidence of real distinctions between bituminous coal
operations and other mining operations was found, and the act
was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the police power. One
justice dissented on the basis of a violation of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment upon finding no material differen-
ces between persons subject to the act and persons similarly
situated but not subject to it. The dissent failed to find sufficient
distinctions to justify legislative regulation of bitunimous coal
operations while not regulating all persons engaged in open pit or
strip mining.74 Coverage of the law has now been expanded to in-
clude anthracite and bituminous coal operations. A challenge to
the registration fee as an unconstitutional tax, resulting from the
non-uniformity of its application, was countered by treating it
as a license fee for the privilege of mining; therefore it was not
subject to the requirement of uniformity of taxation.
" Dufour v. Maize, 357 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
" The non-regulated operations included limestone, shale, flint, clay,
ganister, iron ore, and cannel coal.
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The Maryland act regulating coal operations was the object of
a suit for a decree to declare it unconstitutional and for injunctive
relief to restrain its enforcement. 5 This legislation was found to
have a real and substantial relation to the police power with a pur-
pose of preserving the public health and safety, but was held to be
unconstitutional in violation of equal protection rights due to the
exclusion of one county from its coverage. An increase in the
cost of mining was considered to be immaterial. In answer to a
challenge on denial of equal protection through the act's non-cover-
age of limestone and slate quarries, the court, citing from Jeffrey
Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg70 upheld the state's power to classify
the subjects of legislation. Such classification was held to be
within the equal protection clause provided it is not arbitrary or
unreasonable. The dangers from limestone and slate quarrying
were found to be considerably less than the dangers from strip
mining of coal, therefore it was reasonable to exclude them from
the act's coverage. The court further upheld the delegation of
authority to the Director of the Bureau of Mines, an administrative
official, to set the required bond between statutory limits of 5000
dollars to 20,000 dollars and to decide the degree of refilling that
would be required.
VII. NORTH CAROLINA
Twentieth century developments in North Carolina have
brought this state to the threshold where impending governmental
control of surface mining activities has become a paramount public
concern, particularly in selected areas of the state. Entrance of
state and local legislative influence into this area has been minimal,
but recent activities and legislation indicate a transitional period
has been initiated.
A framework within which the state and local governments may
operate is available. The North Carolina Constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or
special act or resolution relating to health, sanitation, and the
abatement of nuisances; . . . regulating labor, trade, mining, or
manufacturing. . . . Any local, private or special act or reso-
lution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall
" Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69
A.2d 471 (1949).11-235 U.S. 571 (1915).
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be void. The General Assembly shall have power to pass gen-
eral laws regulating matters set out in this section.?
Through this provision the General Assembly is authorized to enact
statewide legislation within its police power but still subject to the
guarantees of due process and equal protection afforded the in-
dividual and his property.78 There are presently no general regu-
lations of surface mining activities of the nature discussed in this
article, although the Interstate Mining Compact commits the state
to establishment of a program for the conservation and use of mined
lands.
Entrance of North Carolina in 1967 as a member of the Inter-
state Mining Compact79 is a milestone in the state's recognition of
the pressing problems facing its mining activities. The Compact
represents the realization by its member states of the adverse and
undesirable effects of mining on public and private interests, of
the need for regulation, conservation and restoration, and of the
state's position of responsibility in protecting the interests of all
affected parties. Each member state is committed to formulating
and establishing an effective program for the use and conservation
of productive mineral lands through the establishment of standards,
enactment of laws, and continuation of currently effective schemes.
This program must be directed to the protection of the public and
individual landowners; to the conduct of mining in a manner de-
signed to reduce adverse effects on the economic, residential, recre-
ational or aesthetic value and utility of land and water; to the re-
quirement for restoration and rehabilitation of mined lands; and
to the abatement and control of land, water and air pollution. The
Interstate Mining Commission has the function to study operations
and techniques, make recommendations, gather and disseminate
information, and cooperate with the federal government and any
public or private entities having interest within the purview of the
Compact.
"N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29 (emphasis added).18 U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Ch. 946, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws. The Compact is sponsored by the
Council of State Governments and became effective upon enactment by four
states. It provides for a Commission to be composed of a representative
(the Governor or an alternate) from each member state and for an advisory
body in each member state. The North Carolina advisory body will be an
eleven-member "Mining Council" composed of state administrative officials,
members of the General Assembly, representatives of mining industries,
and representatives of nongovernmental conservation interests.
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North Carolina's commitment to a program designed to ac-
complish these purposes places the burden on the state to enact
general laws or to delegate adequate authority to state agencies
or local governments. Accomplishment of this through general
laws creates the difficulties of statewide legislation over the entire
surface mining industry or, as a minimum, over one particular
industry, e.g. gravel quarry operations. The wide range of to-
pography, cultivation and population density existing across the
breadth of the state poses significant problems for any control that
would be appropriate and acceptable under the various situations.
Large variations of interests must be co-ordinated in the establish-
ment of such controls. The need for regulation is also not as
prevalent in certain areas of the state as in other areas where metro-
politan centers are developing or where adverse mining practices
have developed or will probably develop. North Carolina does
not have a single extractive industry of essentially statewide import,
as is found in several of the coal mining states, which warrants state-
wide regulation of the industry. These factors indicate that local
controls would be more effective with incentive and assistance fur-
nished by the state. To ensure the local governments' ability to
enact adequate regulations, they should be delegated both zoning
and direct regulatory powers.
Local governments have only the regulatory powers delegated
by the General Assembly. The power for both counties and
municipal corporations to effectuate zoning controls has been dele-
gated. "For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or
the general welfare," the boards of county commissioners and the
legislative boards of incorporated towns are empowered to regulate
and restrict "the location and use of buildings, structures, and land
for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, except farming."'81
The statutes also enable the local bodies to provide for a board of ad-
justment to determine and vary the application of enacted regula-
tions in harmony with their general purpose and intent and in
accordance with rules contained within the regulations. The 1967
General Assembly amended both statutes to permit the local legis-
lative bodies or boards of adjustment to issue special use permits
or conditional use permits in accordance with procedures contained
:'See Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E.2d 164 (1946).
'
1N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 153-266.10, 160-172 (Supp. 1967).
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in the regulations and to impose reasonable and appropriate con-
ditions and safeguards on the permits. 2
Powers of direct prohibition and regulation are furnished to
municipal corporations "to define, prohibit, abate, or suppress all
things detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, conveni-
ence, and welfare of the people, and all nuisances and causes
thereof. 8 3  The county commissioners were delegated power "to
prevent and abate nuisances, whether on public or private property;
. . . to define, prohibit, abate, or suppress all things detrimental
to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience and welfare of
the people . . . ; and to make and enforce any other types of
local police, sanitary, and other regulations . . ."I" Due to the
exclusion of forty-four counties from the coverage of this statute,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held it to be a local act and
therefore void under article II, section 29 of the Constitution.8 5 As
a consequence of this ruling, any controls to be exerted by the county
commissioners under the present enabling laws must be under their
zoning authority.
Success of local governments in enacting zoning or direct con-
trols will be aided by the position of the North Carolina Supreme
Court that when an ordinance is enacted within the grant of power
to the local body, there is a presumption that it is reasonable.8 6
An example of the county commissioners' utilization of their
zoning power is furnished by the recently enacted amendments to
the Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance.87 The ordinance
previously permitted extractive uses in residential and industrial
districts upon conformance with minimum restrictions, approval
of a rehabilitation plan, and issuance of a permit by the County
Planning Board.
As amended, the ordinance creates a Rural Industrial District
(RID) providing for extractive uses, and a Rural Processing
District (RPD) providing for extractive use processing. Extractive
82 Ch. 1208, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws.
8
"N.C.GEN. STAT. § 160-200(6) (1964).84N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(55) (Supp. 1965).
High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697(1965). This statute was not amended by the 1967 General Assembly.
" See Gene's, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 259 N.C. 118, 129 S.E.2d 889(1963).
"' Orange County, N.C., Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance § 8(1967).
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uses are defined to include mining, quarrying, stripping, and other
removal of natural resources for non-farming purposes and are
permitted only in RID and RPD districts. Normal sand, gravel
and quarrying removal and processing operations are permitted in
the RID districts, but for other extractive uses only the removal
operation is permitted in RID districts. Both situations are subject
to special provisions.
An annual permit must be obtained for all extractive uses. Sand,
gravel and quarrying operations may be under a Limited Extractive
Use Permit issued by the County Board of Adjustment and sub-
ject to provisions similar to those existing prior to the amendment.
All other operations must be under an Extractive Use Permit issued
after a public hearing by the County Commissioners and on a
recommendation by the County Planning Board. The Extractive
Use Permit can be obtained only after an operations plan and pro-
gram is submitted and approved, an operations bond is filed, a re-
habilitation plan and program is submitted and approved, and a re-
habilitation bond is filed. A fee of 150 dollars is charged for the
application. Existing extractive uses must comply with the pro-
visions of the ordinance. The operation plan must include a de-
tailed topographic map showing estimated ultimate maximum depth
and surface extent of the operation; provisions for a buffer strip
of at least 200 feet; and provisions for testing and control to
maintain pre-existing air, surface water, and ground water quali-
ties. Strict noise and vibration limits are imposed. The rehabili-
tation plan must include a topographic map and an aerial photo-
graph of the proposed excavation site and detailed plans for return-
ing the site to the condition shown on the map and photograph.
Rehabilitation includes regrading, replacement of the topsoil, re-
fertilization, and vegetation replacement. Failure to comply with
the plans, as approved, will result in forfeiture of the bonds and
revocation of the permit.
The stated objectives of the Chapel Hill Township ordinance
are to further the general welfare of all residents by safeguarding
property values and to provide for residential, commercial and
industrial growth in Orange County. The unique intermingling
of industrial technology and research facilities with the advanced
educational facilities in the area makes these objectives particularly
applicable and, apparently, necessary. The avowed legislative
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intent to further this growth and to protect property interests, with
the interrelated aesthetic considerations of an "historical" surround-
ing, should provide an ample basis of reasonableness for the classifi-
cation and regulation of land uses.
Certain difficulties may be encountered in the application of
the ordinance. The provision for topographic rehabilitation to the
original configuration presents the same objection that the court
found in the Illinois act88 relative to requiring the reconstruction
of a mosquito breeding pond, if one had previously existed. By
requiring approval of the rehabilitation plan and providing for its
modification by the County Commissioners, the ordinance is not
forever fixed to this objective of the plan; it provides sufficient
flexibility for a court to distinguish the Illinois difficulty. Testing
for dust and noise qualities on all property lines and adherence to
stringent standards in suppressing them appear to present problems
of first impression relative to surface removal operations. There is
a possibility that compliance with these requirements will make
an operation economically unattractive, therefore the ordinance
would have the effect of prohibiting a desired usage. This objec-
tion is countered by the majority approach of not invalidating a
zoning control that prohibits a use, if it is otherwise within the
police power."9 To the credit of this ordinance is its adoption
prior to the influx of any sizeable new mining operation and its
notification to any potential operator of the requisite quality stan-
dards for activities in the regulated districts.
The Chapel Hill Township Zoning Ordinance facilitates a
comparison with the previously discussed benefits and detriments
resulting from statewide regulations. An attempt to impose the
above discussed quality control standards throughout the state would
raise serious questions of equal protection for an operation in Guil-
ford County as opposed to a similar operation in Brunswick County.
It is hardly conceivable that the same noise level values could be
reasonably imposed in both areas. A satisfactory and mutually
beneficial compromise would be the use of local regulations, adopted
and enforced at the city and county level, with state agencies and
their professional staffs providing advisory, research and testing
assistance. An additional consideration, and one of primary con-
8 Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947).
'o See note 26 supra.
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cern to many political and industrial factions, is that regulations at
the local level should tend to deter "big brother," be it the state or
federal government, from imposing its own influence and solutions
on the local scene.
WLLIAM H. THOMPSON
Constitutional Law-Legislative Election of a Governor
When the "one man, one vote" principle first arose in a case
concerning the county unit system in Georgia,' the question asked
was how far it would be extended. The answer came quickly in
two historic decisions. The Court ordered that congressional dis-
tricts be approximately equal in population,' and that both houses
of state legislatures be apportioned on the basis of population.'
Yet these decisions raised more questions concerning what limita-
tions the Court would put on the "one man, one vote" maxim.
These questions were partially answered in Fortson v. Morris,4
where the Court, with a vigorous dissent, did put a limitation on
the applicability of the "one man, one vote" concept,5 refusing to
use it to prevent the legislative election of a governor in which the
winning candidate might have been (and, in fact, eventually was)
the loser at the polls.
The case arose out of the 1966 race for Governor of Georgia.
Democrat segregationist Lester Maddox contested with conserva-
'Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) : "The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing-one person, one vote."
'Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'385 U.S. 231 (1966).
'Since Fortson v. Morris the Supreme Court has limited further the
application of "one man, one vote." In Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967), aff'g 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966), the Court held that
"one man, one vote" was not applicable to the selection of a county school
board because the choice was not by an elective process, no election being
required because the offices were nonlegislative. In Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112 (1967), rev'g 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966), the Court refused to
apply "one man, one vote" to the at-large election of a city council, where
there was a requirement that the members reside in certain boroughs. The
Court, however, did not reach the merits of applying "one man, one vote"
to local governments in these cases, or in Moody v. Flowers and Supeivisors
of Suffolk County v. Bianchi, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), dismissed on jurisdic-
tional grounds.
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